Sometime in the next few weeks, Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev will sign a follow-on agreement to the expired Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that eliminated the firepower equivalent to that wielded by the Death Star. Consequent Senate deliberations over a new treaty are sure to feature accusations that the Russians intend to lie, cheat, and steal, rather than uphold their end of the bargain. Senators opposed to the treaty will invoke Ronald Reagan's name with lusty enthusiasm. Already, Senator Jon Kyl, the number two Republican in the chamber, has indicated his willingness to fight along these lines, and on these terms.
Senators who invoke Reagan in 2010 would have bitterly opposed him in 1988, after he signed the first treaty ever to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. His admirers forget that for five months after December 1987, when Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty eliminating four Soviet missiles for NATO's every one, Republican Senators like Jesse Helms and Dan Quayle held up ratification on the grounds that the Soviets could not be trusted. "Believe it or not there are elements who are hinting it would be a bad treaty," President Reagan wrote in his diary after meeting with Republican leaders on the eve of Gorbachev's arrival.
The delay over INF ratification mattered then, because it made finalizing a START agreement impossible before the end of Reagan's presidency. A delay over a new START would matter now, because rehashing the same arguments of Helms and Quayle distracts from the more important question: what role should the United States assign its nuclear arsenal after President Obama has received a Nobel Prize, in part, for announcing in Prague last year his quest to eliminate nuclear weapons?
Proponents of low-yield, “bunker busting” nuclear bombs, argue that such weapons would provide a more credible threat to deter state-sponsored terrorism, and that they might prove indispensible to strike hardened targets in any potential military engagement with Iran or North Korea. Opponents fear that a new generation of less powerful nuclear weapons would lower the threshold by which the United States -- or another nuclear power -- might use them.
Neither position is so hawkish or dovish as the other might contend, and President Obama has shrewdly indicated his preference for zero nuclear weapons without vilifying those who may disagree. He has also managed to sidestep any meaningful debate about just how to get from point A to point B. This is a national discussion worth having; unfortunately, it is also one where complex matters of military strategy, long-term forecasting, and alliance management are likely to be obscured by political demagogy.
Obama can silence the Cheney Family Choir, however, simply by invoking recent history. Perhaps he might declare that his own attitude toward nuclear weapons derives not from Jimmy Carter but Ronald Reagan. Both men spoke of abolishing nuclear weapons, but only Reagan achieved any real success. And in the last year of his presidency, he wanted to eliminate still more nuclear weapons. "We need to go for the gold," Reagan instructed Secretary of State George Shultz in February 1988, when the administration was deliberating over whether to pursue a last-minute START agreement.
Like Reagan, Obama should go for the gold. The elder statesmen already in his corner could not be more distinguished. For the past few years, Shultz (arguably the best secretary of state since Dean Acheson) as well as Henry Kissinger (who would argue) have joined with Democrats William Perry and Sam Nunn in beating the drum for a "world free of nuclear weapons." A new documentary they have produced, Nuclear Tipping Point, illustrates that no matter how prudent their keepers, no matter the safeguards, these weapons continue to imperil our planet.
For the moment, support for nuclear abolition is growing. Unlike climate change, affirming one's support does not entail the everyday guilt that accompanies purchasing bottled water. The real test is coming, however, not just when the Senate takes on a new START but the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty after rejecting it over a decade ago. Critics will raise questions to which there are no perfect answers; the Obama administration should answer truthfully. Yes, whatever emerges to replace START will have its flaws. No, we cannot be one hundred percent sure that the Russians will not cheat. Neither questions nor answers have changed significantly over the past twenty years. But we do know today that Russia is no longer a sprawling empire with an ideological ax to grind. And we know conclusively that arms reductions contributed to ending one cold war, and that there is no compelling reason to begin another.
James Graham Wilson is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Virginia, and a 2009-2010 Gallatin Fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
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